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STATES’ RIGHTS GONE WRONG?
SECESSION, NULLIFICATION, AND REVERSENULLIFICATION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
Sean Beienburg*
PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (UNIVERSITY
PRESS OF KANSAS 2015). PP. 296. HARDCOVER $39.95.
SANFORD LEVINSON ED., NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS 2016). PP.
384. HARDCOVER $45.00. PAPERBACK $24.95.

In The Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, James Schleifer asked a
reasonable question: how could Alexis de Tocqueville, a thoughtful observer of and
committed believer in America’s constitutional federalism and states’ rights as a bulwark
against the soft despotism of centralized power, condone secession while spitting his own
wrath against John Calhoun and the nullifying fire-eaters he feared would break that
Union?1
Although not rooting secession in a specifically constitutional right, as Tocqueville
hinted at, Edward Livingston, Tocqueville’s close American contact (and the only person
to be thanked in Democracy in America), showed the theoretical and historical way to
decouple Calhoun’s nullification from secession. While Tocqueville’s oft-repeated
contempt for the rough populism and violent temper of Jackson appears through
Democracy in America, Tocqueville admired Jackson’s Secretary of State Livingston, a
respected constitutional thinker and former Louisiana senator turned key member of
Jackson’s cabinet.2
Livingston had thought long and hard about states’ rights and the methods to enforce

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lehigh University, Ph.D., Princeton University (2015). Thanks
to the Paul J. Franz Grant at Lehigh for financial support.
1. JAMES T. SCHLEIFER, THE MAKING OF TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101, 134 (1980).
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT IN AMERICA: THEIR FRIENDSHIP AND THEIR
TRAVELS 155 n.201, 203, 557 (Olivier Zunz ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2010). That is not to say Tocqueville
necessarily picked this up from Livingston; Schleifer offers plausible circumstantial evidence that Tocqueville
acquired this notion from various circulating legal treatises. See SCHLEIFER, supra note 1, at 131–34.
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them: in his first political life Livingston had been a young New York Congressman deeply
committed to the states’ rights principles of 1798 announced by his Republican heroes
Jefferson and Madison in their Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Three decades later he
similarly despised nullification as the underappreciated but arguably most important
participant in the Webster-Hayne-(Livingston) debates, since he was one with
unimpeachable states’ rights bona fides who nonetheless assailed nullification as hostile
to constitutional textualism.3
In this, he was like Jackson, whose Proclamation on Nullification Livingston helped
write.4 Livingston nonetheless conceded secession as a last ditch revolutionary (if not
constitutional) tool to guarantee states’ rights: if all of the constitutional mechanisms (such
as judicial review or legislative interposition lobbying members of Congress) did
ultimately fail and the federal government illegally amassed power, Livingston allowed
that a state could claim the contract was broken and withdraw. 5 Stated more directly, for
Livingston, nullification was always out of bounds but secession was not (a position later
more forcefully adopted by Jefferson Davis, who did find it specifically constitutional). 6
What one could not do was remain in the Union, benefiting from its advantages while
unilaterally vetoing its actions: if, Livingston held, one truly believed the Constitution had
been broken, one had to walk away “at the risk of all the penalties attached to an
unsuccessful resistance to established authority.”7
And indeed, at the dawn of the Civil War, it was not only southerners who thought
so: Lincoln’s anti-secession hawkishness was not shared by all of his Republican
contemporaries: future Chief Justice Salmon Chase, then a member of the peace
commission trying desperately to avert the oncoming war, lamented that “[t]he thing to be
done is to let the South go.”8
Today, as Americans muse ever more openly about leaving the Union and
unilaterally blocking federal power, two troubling but important books discuss the fragility
of a federal system often taken for granted. Both focus on questions of constitutional
failure from complementary angles, especially in an era of ever intensifying political
polarization. One, Paul Nolette’s Federalism on Trial, exposes the ways in which states’
rights has created a paradoxical regime through which states dictate policy to both the
federal government and their fellow states. 9 The other, Nullification and Secession in
Modern Constitutional Thought, edited by Sanford Levinson, brings together a variety of
perspectives assessing the past, present, and possible future of those doctrines and their
3. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE
NULLIFICATION CRISIS (1987); WILLIAM B. HATCHER, EDWARD LIVINGSTON: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN AND
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRAT 46–50, 348 (1940).
4. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 380–87 (2005).
5. 21 REG. DEB. 266–70 (1830). Should all those fail, and “if the act be one of those few which, in its
operation, cannot be submitted to the Supreme Court, and be one that will, in the opinion of the State, justify the
risk of a withdrawal from the Union, that this last extreme remedy may at once be resorted to.” Id. at 270.
6. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 487 (1861).
7. 21 REG. DEB. 270 (1830).
8. MARK TOOLEY, THE PEACE THAT ALMOST WAS 134 (2015) (quoting GEORGE SEWALL BOUTWELL,
REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 270 (1902)).
9. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL (2015).
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applicability within the American constitutional project.10
Paul Nolette’s Federalism on Trial pivots on these questions, with an in-depth study
showing how states can unilaterally steer federal policy through lawsuits by states’ legal
officials. The great achievement of this book is demonstrating how these ostensibly normal
tactics—largely lawsuits and settlements—by state Attorneys General (henceforth AGs)
can actually be more disruptive to the federalist constitutional order than some of the more
radical “neonullification” politics discussed in Levinson’s volume.
AGs operate in the twilight of politics and law, with institutional prestige, a legal
pedigree, and a façade of apolitical public-interest lawyering. They are thus able to
leverage legitimacy (to say nothing of standing) in seeking to advance controversial
arguments that other plaintiffs such as businesses would have difficulty deploying. 11
Federalism on Trial focuses on case studies on prescription drug policy (Chapters
Three through Five), environmental issues and greenhouse gas litigation culminating in
the 2007 case of Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency12 (Chapters Six
through Seven), and a hybrid analytical chapter (Chapter Eight), before finally turning to
a brief discussion of the more traditional conservative counter-efforts to block federal
policy (Chapter Nine). Although mostly confined in its presentation to an appendix and a
few charts interspersed throughout the text, Nolette has assembled an impressive
quantitative data set to complement the rich case studies.
As this data shows, state AGs no longer serve a primarily defensive role,
representing states in lawsuits raised against them. Instead, since the mid-1980s, they have
increasingly collaborated on offensive multi-state litigation efforts entailing ever larger
groups of states.13
Nearly all of this multistate litigation occurs in one of four broad issue areas:
antitrust, consumer protection, health care, and the environment.14 These are not, Nolette
insists, state AGs operating in federal regulatory gaps but instead in political realms which
are already heavily regulated, with the AGs jumping in on one side and leaning toward
federal overregulation—an ironic result of states’ rights.15
Nolette argues that this form of state AG litigation can be “policy-creating,” insofar
as it effectively forces corporations to adopt a policy desired by state AGs as the cost of a
settlement (as in the case of drug pricing and consumer protection). It can also be “policyforcing,” requiring the federal government to act in a particular way (as with
environmental emissions), largely with statutes featuring decentralized, litigious structures
rather than self-enforcement.
The traditional story of states fighting against federal power—what he calls “policyblocking litigation”—is thus a much smaller part of the book, but Nolette includes it at the

10. NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2015)
[hereinafter NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION].
11. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 102, 194–95.
12. 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency has authority under the Clean
Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
13. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 19–22.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id. at 207–09.
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end to show how the same tactical and organizational dynamics of cross-state alliances
developed by progressives seeking greater regulation in the medical and environmental
realms are now employed by conservatives banding together in a polarized climate.
How did this happen? At the most basic level, this is the consequence of broader
developments in American politics, namely the judicialization of all issues through
adversarial legalism in lieu of traditional lawmaking, as Tocqueville long ago
envisioned.16
Federal courts and members of Congress alike have worked to expand grants to and
enlarge the jurisdiction of state AGs, with even some federal agencies colluding with state
AGs in lawsuits against the federal government as a means to force federal action.17 States,
in turn, have bolstered the institutional apparatus of these offices, drastically scaling up
budgetary support and staffing. State AGs themselves have contributed, building up a
national association training fellow members to more effectively argue before the Supreme
Court.18
The surprising paucity of earlier state collaborations against federal power is one
reason for the brevity of the penultimate chapter, which describes what we might think of
as more traditional state AG activism—so-called “policy-blocking litigation” challenging
federal legislation and administrative rulings as impeding the rights reserved to the states.
For example, AGs were marginal players in the judicial federalism revolution of the 1990s.
Only three state AGs were involved in United States v. Lopez;19 only Democratic AGs
opposed the federal government in New York v. United States,20 and most AGs, including
most Republican AGs, supported the federal government’s position in United States v.
Morrison.21
Now, however, emboldened by progressive efforts to band together and press for
regulatory settlements, conservatives are much more active. Nolette quotes a half joking
then-Texas Attorney General, now Governor, Greg Abbott, who described his workday as
“I go to the office. I sue the federal government. And then I go home,” which as Nolette
notes was not exactly a joke, since Abbott led twenty-four lawsuits against the Obama
administration.22
Whereas governors historically were the state institution likely to insinuate
themselves in federal controversies—as Abbott has done in throwing his weight behind
the Convention of States movement aiming to claw back federal power through Article

16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds.,
trans., 2000); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); GORDON
SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2007).
17. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 4, 35–42.
18. Id. at 33–34.
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress’s lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause does not
extend so far from commerce as to authorize the regulation of handguns in schools).
20. 505 U.S. 144 (1991) (holding that Congress may not require state legislatures to enact specific
legislation).
21. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to create a federal
civil cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence). See NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 187–88.
22. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 168.
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V23—increasingly one sees blocs of state AGs rallying on either side of high salience
federal issues—usually with GOP AGs aggressively coordinating their efforts against the
federal government and Democrats defending it.24
Like many of the contributors in the Levinson volume, Nolette notes that state
officials have an incentive to play up the level of federal conflict, appealing to constituents
eager to see someone fight Washington, especially when overlaid with partisanship and
polarization. Polarization and the nationalization of politics means AGs, always keen to
leverage that position into higher office, have concluded that suing out-party feds makes
a particularly useful platform for ascent.25
Federalism on Trial offers a firm rejoinder to those who, whether happily or
dolefully, have marked the end of meaningful federalism in America. 26 That rejoinder is
a troubling one, regardless of one’s views on federalism—a lingering “national neurosis”27
or the centerpiece and crown jewel of a lost Constitution. 28
As many scholars have noted, the new regime of post-New Deal cooperative
federalism is not zero-sum in limiting government power, like its dual federalist
predecessor, but it instead authorizes the expansion of both sovereigns, with the states and
federal government each more powerful when working for common aims and dividing
responsibility based on effectiveness. 29 What Nolette shows, however, is that this
paradoxically has empowered progressive state AGs to use litigation to force the feds to
act in ways states want.
This at times leads Nolette to seem almost wistful for the now discarded “dual
federalism,” and its clearer channels of responsibility and accountability. Indeed, his
unease with the implications of this new cooperative federalism lead him to point out that
the vestiges of American federalism are no longer operating either for its original goals
under dual federalism—decentralizing American governance, enabling diversity, and
limiting federal power—or even the revisionist defenses offered for cooperative
federalism, with dialogue, diffusion, experimentation, and gap-filling as benefits of
divided sovereignty.30 Instead, although he does not use this language specifically, he
clearly fears an unholy hybrid of coercive federalism and a form of reverse nullification,
resulting in states unilaterally dictating policy to the rest of the country. 31
23. Brandi Grissom, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Calls for Convention of States to Take Back States’ Rights,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/01/08/gov-greg-abbottcalls-for-constitutional-convention-to-take-back-states-rights.
24. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 32, 187–88.
25. Id. at 162–63.
26. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014); ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE
IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
27. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.
903 (1994).
28. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
29. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008);
Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2009).
30. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 10–13; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV.
1 (1950).
31. John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139
(1990).
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Nolette recognizes the problem of democratic accountability, which John Marshall
noted in McCulloch v. Maryland 32 and which was further developed into critiques of
nullification by Daniel Webster and Edward Livingston. 33 Neither state governments,
setting policy for their own citizens, nor the federal government, setting policy for the
people of the United States (within constitutional limits), posed a (theoretical) problem of
accountability. In both cases, the relevant group of citizens retained sovereignty to replace
their officials and pursue a new policy. Nullification breaks this, allowing a subunit to
control policy beyond its own borders and dictate policy to those who have no recourse—
in effect, Eliot Spitzer as an inverted John Calhoun. As Nolette writes, “[a]lthough it is not
unusual in the history of American federalism for individual state statutes to prohibit
activity otherwise legal in other states, what is new is the AGs’ effort to use the strict
standards of state law for a form of national regulation . . . .”34
The new regime of AG lawsuits thus mirrors the problem of nullification: in that
case, governing officials from a single state sought to set a negative national policy for the
people of the country as a whole. Now, such a state or group of states sets an affirmative
national policy, similarly without democratic control, an extreme example of what Jacob
Levy has described as “outward-facing” federalism by which states affect politics beyond
their borders rather than simply seek to be left alone. 35
Moreover, Nolette shows that this is not only a problem of federalism but of the
separation of powers, as AGs set policy without the benefits of deliberation produced by
the elected branches. Nolette argues that under this litigation regime, just as a handful of
states may not balance the needs of the country, neither do AGs have much of an incentive
to balance competing public policy aims. For example, in targeting pharmaceutical pricing
schemes, they do not have to factor in the implicit subsidization of other expensive
procedures through arguably overpriced, ostensibly “fraudulent” drug pricing, or, in the
case of environmental protection, economic vitality against carbon emissions. Legislators
and executive branch officials must do this, either through direct law-making or
administrative notice and comment, but AGs are able to operate with a troubling myopia
which additionally allows a divide-and-conquer strategy targeting business by business,
since corporations have far less incentive to assist a specific legal case against a rival than
they do to band together for lobbying purposes. AGs can even help administrative agencies
bypass their own democratic checks and arguably statutory authorization: for example,
Nolette is troubled by the possibility of EPA officials colluding with state AGs to fix policy
undesired by the administration. Such settlements, he fears, allow rogue bureaucrats to
lock in and bind the hands of future EPA officials to whatever settlement the AGs have
wrung out in expanding statutes beyond the purposes to which they were tailored by their
drafters.36 Even worse, Nolette worries that AGs may brush aside legal and constitutional
32. 17 U.S. 316, 428–30 (1819).
33. ELLIS, supra note 3; Sean Beienburg, Neither Nationalism nor Nullification: The Battle for the States’
Rights Middle Ground During Prohibition, AM. POL. THOUGHT (forthcoming 2018).
34. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 85, 110–13.
35. Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Jurisdiction, and Resistance, NISKANEN CTR. (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/federalism-jurisdiction-resistance.
36. NOLETTE, supra note 9, at 90–93, 158–67, 180–86.
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issues constraining other actors: other institutions refrained from imposing or loosened
advertising constraints on pharmaceuticals on grounds that they violated the First
Amendment. The nominally “voluntary” settlements procured in AG settlements,
however, bypassed these civil libertarian worries. 37
My only real quibble with this remarkable book is the compressed treatment given
to state pushback against federal power, which feels like something of an afterthought.
This brevity leads him to at times impose an awkward analytical framework: for example,
while Nolette concedes that its earlier roots make anti-federal, defensive litigation
different, he holds that “policy-blocking litigation” is still thus ultimately nationalizing
like the other two, but that does not necessarily seem right: lawsuits against Obamacare
did not seek to have Romneycare wiped out as well.
One can understand why his focus remained elsewhere: the truly innovative
argument is his claim that progressive AGs’ use of states’ rights actually inverted
federalism by enabling a handful of states to dictate expansive federal policy.
Subsequent events have continued to vindicate Nolette’s findings. Conservative
columnist Charles Krauthammer observed that under the Obama administration, states
(and specifically their attorneys general) became perhaps the strongest check on the
executive in light of an increasingly pliant, risk-averse Congress.38 Fights over President
Trump’s immigration proposals have now similarly ended up as dueling coalitions of state
attorneys general.39
This is an important book for scholars of federalism, American Political
Development (“APD”), and Law and Society alike. For federalism scholars, Nolette shows
how cooperative federalism not only allows the federal government to dictate politics to
the states, but the states to dictate to the federal government. For APD scholars, he
conclusively demonstrates that AGs have become a key player in building national
government institutions. And for Law and Society scholars, he shows that this key policymaking is not taking place either in legislation or grand trends in jurisprudence but in the
shadows of bargaining among state officials, bureaucrats, and corporations.
Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought, edited (and with lead
essays) by Sanford Levinson and with contributions from a host of leading luminaries of
public law, offers a timely engagement with these controversial constitutional doctrines.40
Several of the contributors play with various metaphors in trying to understand the role
secession and nullification play in constitutional thought—are they dinosaurs, relics from
a bygone age to be observed from afar? Are they undead zombies, killed by the Civil War
until resurrected by fringe necromancers? The trigger behind militia movements or

37. Id. at 69–84.
38. Charles Krauthammer, The Revolt of the Attorneys General, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 2, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445423/barack-obama-legacy-state-attorneys-check-executive-branch.
39. Alexander Burns, How Attorneys General Became Democrats’ Bulwark Against Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/attorneys-general-democrats-trump-travel-ban.html;
Austin Yack, On Immigration, GOP State Attorneys General Echo Trump, NAT’L REV. (June 27, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448987/immigration-policy-trump-administration-republican-stateattorneys-general-sanctuary-cities.
40. NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10.
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deranged lone wolves? Or, might one or both be worthy of a grudging respect?
James Read and Neal Allen’s entry rightly posits classic, Calhounian nullification
as the proactive obstruction of federal enforcement of federal law by a state or group of
states, but one of this book’s strengths is to show that American political practice rather
freely invokes the term nullification. Thus, nullification is used to refer to a wide variety
of tactics resisting federal activity, from Calhoun’s vision to less controversial but perhaps
more important tactics such as non-commandeering41—seemingly almost everything but
secession itself.
Another of the book’s strengths, especially timely as some muse about “Calexit,” is
that it demonstrates that secession, although functionally more radical in terms of its
practical consequences, is ironically more rooted in American thought and arguably less
destructive of the constitutional (as opposed to political) order. Levinson observes in his
lead essay that the United States was founded as a constitutional secessionist movement,42
effectively an English civil war dividing those who had come to interpret the Glorious
Revolution differently (either rooted in the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, as among
the Tory parliamentarians, or as a federalist compound empire leaving domestic legislation
in the hands of local assemblies, with Parliament for the UK metropole and the Burgesses
for Virginia).43
Levinson quotes from a variety of sources conceding the defensibility of secession,
including, most surprising to this reviewer, John Quincy Adams, who grimly observed, “I
love the Union as I love my wife. But if my wife should ask for and insist upon a
separation, she should have it though it broke my heart.”44 His chapter reveals that
discussions of secession have been more common than imagined, though with the
important caveat that much of this rhetoric is secession from within a state, such as the
State of Jefferson seeking to leave the states of the coastal west. After fading for many
years however, there are growing separatist impulses seeking not merely a more
responsive state legislature but full separation from the Union—on the right among
Texans, on the left among Vermonters, and, since the book’s publication, Californians.45
Levinson is clearly troubled by the divorce analogy raised by Adams and equally
alienated by Lincoln’s glib retort, that allowing divorce from the Union would result in
little more than a “free-love arrangement.”46 Levinson notes that the same logic would see
us eliminate no-fault divorce, though on the other hand, he retains the metaphor to echo
Jack Balkin’s worry about the fate of anti-secessionists—who, like impoverished children

41. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not require state
legislatures to enact specific legislation); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress
may not require state executive officers to execute federal law).
42. Sanford Levinson, The 21st Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American Political
Rhetoric, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 10, 32.
43. Id. at 34. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2010).
44. Levinson, supra note 42, at 34–35.
45. Id. at 36–39.
46. President Abraham Lincoln, Speech from the Balcony of the Bates House at Indianapolis, Indiana (Feb.
11, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 195 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
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or ex-wives, would be left behind when their state voted to walk away. 47
Although he disavows any connection to federalism as an inherent good, Levinson’s
essays demonstrate a genuine sympathy for the Second Vermont Republic, rooted in
claims of small scale and real community hostile to imperialism and mass corporate
capitalism. Nor is the intellectual lineage of these Green Mountaineers an excavation of
Jefferson Davis: as Levinson notes, it is built on the thoughts of respected
establishmentarians like George Kennan and Louis Brandeis (who while a progressive was
very much a skeptic of centralization, as evident from the tongue-lashing he delivered to
the New Deal Brain Trusters after A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States).48
Levinson thus finds himself taking the stance that does unify much of the book,
reserving his real ire for nullification: “I strongly suspect that . . . no one reading this article
adopts, as a blanket rule, the principle of opposition to all secessionist movements . . . .
Thus, placing secession—and proponents of secession—in the same cage reserved for
zombies or dinosaurs,” or, as Levinson noted earlier, nullifiers, “seems foolhardy.”49
Separating nullification from secession is not the only careful distinction drawn
within its pages. Although we often speak of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in
tandem, Jonathan Gienapp’s entry adopts the position sharply distinguishing the two. 50
For Madison, interposition, state protest against unconstitutional action, was a means of
‘popular vigilance’—read popular constitutionalism— in maintaining the Constitution, not
a call for destructive revolution. Gienapp argues that interposition was pedagogical,
ensuring that the people rallied behind textualism and original meaning (instead of original
intent), since the former directly involved the people themselves. 51 After the crucial act of
ratifying, Gienapp notes Madison believed that “the people . . . had a crucial role to play
in constitutional maintenance by watching for encroachments . . . to observe if politicians
were respecting the Constitution’s plain meaning.”52 Thus, in a well-functioning federal
polity, they would be “guardians of the people’s sovereignty rather than the final
expositors of it.”53
Conventional nullification takes a further blow in Read and Allen’s chapter, adapted

47. Levinson, supra note 42, at 42–45.
48. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Immediately following Justice Hughes’ announcement of the Court’s opinion in
Schechter, Justice Brandeis said to Thomas G. Corcoran:
This is the end of the business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President that
we’re not going to let this government centralize everything. . . . As for your young men, you call
them together and tell them to get out of Washington – tell them to go home, back to the states. That
is where they must do their work.
3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 280 (1960).
49. Levinson, supra note 42, at 45.
50. Jonathan Gienapp, How to Maintain a Constitution: The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and James
Madison’s Struggle with the Problem of Constitutional Maintenance, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra
note 10, at 53, 53. See also CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2007); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 246–65 (1996).
51. Gienapp, supra note 50, at 75–79.
52. Id. at 80.
53. Id. at 83.
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from an earlier article,54 which shows the unexpected and unfortunate rebirth of
nullification in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. They collect various, surprisingly
numerous nullification-inflected bills and failed bills in the last ten years, although only
one, a thus untested Kansas gun law, truly rises to classic nullification. 55 This, they note,
is in addition to similar, plausibly non-commandeering “quasi-nullification” maneuvers in
the nineteenth century, as well as classic instances of true nullification, such as antebellum
South Carolina’s successful effort to quarantine all black seamen in violation of the
Commerce Clause and James Kilpatrick’s attempt to resurrect nullification as part of
massive resistance in the 1950s.56
I take Read and Allen’s project to be discrediting nullification as part of a renewed
conversation about a decentralized/states’ rights federalism, and in that, they succeed. As
part of that effort, they go a step farther than Gienapp’s defense of Madison and take great
pains to similarly block the light of Jefferson’s halo from casting any glow on nullification.
Thus, Calhoun, not Jefferson’s wispy allusion in the Kentucky Resolution, is the true
formulator of nullification: “all subsequent advocates of nullification, however fond of
quoting Jefferson, depend on Calhoun, whether they recognize it or not.”57 And similarly,
echoing the project most closely associated with Charles Dew, they ensure that we know
South Carolina really was defending slavery, not states’ rights, since it protested
Wisconsin’s own nullification of Ableman v. Booth58 in March 1859: “South Carolina, the
slave state that pioneered . . . nullification, dissolved the Union when free states began
nullifying laws that South Carolina considered essential.”59
Read and Allen argue that Calhoun and his modern day disciples are wrong to argue
that nullification is the only technique to defend decentralized federalism. Not only does
it prevent the feds from protecting citizens from states, but it also is not an especially apt
tool for the states protecting their citizens from federal overreach: “nullification [is not]
the only means by which states communicate opposition to federal laws; to presume that
states must either nullify or abjectly surrender to federal power is to pose a false choice.”60
But, they fear, more are insisting on precisely that choice.
Mark Killenbeck’s chapter further complicates this by noting that the Supreme Court
itself may be unintentionally encouraging a rekindling of these ideas through its state
sovereignty doctrine and specifically its rhetoric of “states as states.” The latter, ostensibly

54. James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and Present, 1 AM. POL.
THOUGHT 263, 263–97 (2012).
55. Gienapp, supra note 50, at 92–97.
56. James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and Present, in
NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 91, 107–18.
57. Id. at 102–03; JAMES H. READ, MAJORITY RULE VERSUS CONSENSUS: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN
C. CALHOUN (2009).
58. 62 U.S. 506 (1859) (holding that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal
courts).
59. Read & Allen, supra note 56, at 111; CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION
COMMISSIONERS AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2001); PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH
(2017).
60. Read & Allen, supra note 56, at 97.
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gleaned in spirit from Texas v. White,61 thus appears to mark that case as not quite the antisecessionist bulwark it is often hailed to be.62
But what of other “nullifications” and anti-federal activity beyond Calhoun’s ghost?
Ernest Young’s provocative entry proposes that we should analyze federalism through the
lens of our separation of powers doctrines: that dual federalism was closer to a rigid
definition of separation of powers with clearly separate spheres, whereas the evolution
toward concurrent and cooperative federalism means that it is more like overlapping
checks and balances. As Young observes in his study of marijuana politics, in an age of
cooperative rather than dual federalism, state pushback ironically has the effect of
crippling the federal policy. 63 (This was equally true under the anomalous 1920s regime
of prohibition which awkwardly fit “concurrent enforcement” within dual federalism.64)
Thus, invoking anti-commandeering to block the machinery of state power is de facto
“nullification for an age of concurrent jurisdiction, in which federal authority to legislate
is largely uncontested but federal resources and political will are both highly limited.”65
Similar to Stephen Engel’s spectrum of court-curbing,66 one might envision a
spectrum of state tactics used to oppose federal power, but as this book shows, doing so
becomes surprisingly difficult. At the tamest end—obviously regular politics—would be
lawsuits and memorials (the Madisonian “interposition” studied by Gienapp), seeking to
persuade courts or Congress to terminate some illegal activity by using what Madison
described in the Virginia Resolution as the constitutionally inclined “necessary and
proper” means to do so.67 At the other end would be secession and nullification.
In the middle would be passive resistance by withdrawing state and local support for
federal objectives through anti-commandeering—in effect, Heather Gerken and Jessica
Bulman-Pozen’s notion of “uncooperative federalism,” of the sort written about by
Young.68 Passing statutes that clearly conflict with the then-existing interpretation of the
Constitution (aimed at generating test cases) challenges the interpretation but, so long as

61. 74 U.S. 700 (1869) (concluding that Texas had never ceased to be a state, despite secession from the
Union).
Not only . . . can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their
union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States,
and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution
as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
Id. at 725.
62. Mark R. Killenbeck, Political Facts, Legal Fictions, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10,
at 223, 242–45. See also MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE 182–86 (1992).
63. Ernest A. Young, Marijuana, Nullification, and the Checks and Balances Model of Federalism, in
NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 125, 126–30.
64. Beienburg, supra note 33; SEAN BEIENBURG, PROHIBITION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATES’ RIGHTS,
1918–1933 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
65. Young, supra note 63, at 139.
66. STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND
CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER (2011).
67. See James Madison, Virginia Resolution of 1798, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1891).
68. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
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the state complies with a reaffirmed interpretation, should not necessarily bother us.
Superficial compliance but functional evasion, of the sort described by Mark Graber’s
chapter, threatens constitutional implementation without challenging its underpinning
norms (at least in the short term). A purely rhetorical but functionally toothless “quasinullification” of the type noted by Read and Allen—in either memorials or statutes or even
constitutional amendments69—adopting the language and precedents of nullification but
not its implementing logic, also fit somewhat uneasily in this hazy middle.
As Levinson observes, “the powerful point behind the notion of uncooperative
federalism is that the practical consequences of the latter may be at least as important as
the legalisms of the former.”70 Thus, as these works show, classifying and ranking these
is much harder, and depends on whether one prioritizes theoretical damage to
constitutional logic or the impact of policy obstruction as the measure of intensity.
From that midpoint, the entries turn from conventional high politics of American
federalism to two useful perspectives: informal individualist constitutionalism and
comparative federalism.
Mark Graber and Jared Goldstein’s entries on private nullification offer perhaps the
most dispiriting contributions in an already grim book. Graber worries about the de facto
“partial nullification” of individual level disobedience hollowing out constitutional
guarantees: police ignoring Miranda v. Arizona71 or turning a blind eye to private violence,
or juror nullification, whose prospect leveraged by defense lawyers is more important than
actual nullification—as in the green light to white violence under Jim Crow. 72 Perhaps
even more troubling is the example of legal officials hiding behind fact finding and the
doctrine of standing to allow continued evasion while waiting for a formal slap down from
above—if one comes at all, since settlements or pardons to avoid cases exposing
constitutional violations remain a viable option to shield malfeasance. 73
As Graber ominously concludes, “constitutional law is surprisingly equivocal when
state and private actors either declare a federal law null and void or behave in ways that
are forbidden by federal law, but do not attempt both simultaneously.”74 Jared Goldstein’s
entry fears popular constitutionalism taken to its endpoint by citizens doing both and
feeling increasingly emboldened to act out through violence. If Gienapp held interposition
to be collective popular vigilance in peacefully signaling Congress to stay within its
boundaries, for Goldstein “insurrection . . . is simply nullification performed at the most
local level of all: the individual citizen.”75
Much like Read and Allen’s entry, Ran Hirschl’s introduction to the comparative

69. John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of American Federalism,
74 ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1637–67 (2011); Sean Beienburg, Contesting the U.S. Constitution Through State
Amendments: The 2011 and 2012 Elections, 129 POL. SCI. Q. 55–85 (2014).
70. Levinson, supra note 42, at 19.
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. Mark A. Graber, Almost Legal: Disobedience and Partial Nullification in American Constitutional
Politics and Law, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 146, 165–67.
73. Id. at 172–74.
74. Id. at 175.
75. Id. at 180.
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section offers a thorough chronicle of the many secession movements in recent world
politics and the ease with which secession and nullification thinking drift together—and
are far more common than Americans, bewildered at resurgent separatist movements
within our borders, understand from looking only to their own history. 76
Alison LaCroix illustrates the surprising continuities of the Confederate Constitution
and the American charter, noting that many proposed changes were ultimately scrapped
and the decision was often made to stick with the 1787 model, resulting in a text which
was idolatrously faithful to U.S. constitutional law—even as leading Confederates reviled
founding principles (for example, Alexander Stephens’s infamous Cornerstone Speech).77
Complementary pieces from Vicki Jackson and Zachary Elkins debate whether or not
constitutions ought to include secession clauses,78 while Mark Tushnet offers a concluding
piece applying labor law logic to think through what good faith secession negotiations
between the new or seceding nation and the ‘remnant’ would look like.79
Although, as with any edited volume, the pieces offer a variety of perspectives, there
is much shared ground even as the contributors hold starkly different views about the
extent to which America’s decentralized federalism remains a celebrated treasure or an
unfortunate historical relic. In short, classical Calhounian nullification gains few friends,
uncooperative/anti-commandeering federalism receives generally positive kudos, and
secession a grudging but ultimately surprisingly sympathetic treatment.
That American politics is ferociously polarized needs little further comment. As
Levinson ominously concludes toward the end, nodding to The Federalist No. 2’s
assessment of Founding-era America, the “political class, even if not necessarily the
population as a whole, could be regarded as homogenous. We do not live in that country
anymore.”80 Now, constitutionalism, partisanship, and geography/region all reinforce one
another and the underlying fracture, with increasingly ‘constitutional’ dialogue alongside
increasingly incompatible, polarized constitutionalisms.
A well-functioning federal system potentially offers a solution to polarization,
scaling conflict down to subnational units, allowing both sides to win in their respective
domains while lowering the stakes in any individual loss.

76. Ran Hirschl, Nullification: Three Comparative Notes, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10,
at 249.
77. Alison L. LaCroix, Continuity in Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitution, in NULLIFICATION
AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 274. See Alexander H. Stephens, Vice President of the Confederate States of
Am., Cornerstone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), in HENRY CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS: IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE 717–29 (Phila., National 1866).
78. Vicki C. Jackson, Secession, Transnational Precedents, and Constitutional Silences, in NULLIFICATION
AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at 314; Zachary Elkins, The Logic and Design of a Low-Commitment Constitution
(Or, How to Stop Worrying About the Right to Secede), in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note 10, at
294.
79. Mark Tushnet, Secession as a Problem in Negotiation, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION, supra note
10, at 343.
80. Levinson, supra note 42, at 49. Contra THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and
efforts . . . have nobly established general liberty and independence.”).
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As both these volumes show in their own way, we are not in that system. Instead,
politics becomes ever more nationalized—including, as Nolette points out,
counterintuitively due to the actions of progressive state AGs employing a paradoxical
nationalist nullification, cloaked within winking but disingenuous nods to states’ rights.
The resulting unhealthy federalism—in which careful attention to enumerated powers is
ignored, but the institutional machinery of state resistance and a latent antipathy to federal
power remain to be mobilized—unsurprisingly threatens to unleash both forms of
nullification chronicled in these books.
Rather than a serious bipartisan commitment to discussing and maintaining the
enumerated powers—both what they allow and what they do not—our discourse on
federalism has involved what Andrew Busch described as “limited government on the
cheap.”81 A few political observers have proposed a descaling armistice, but they seem to
be unheralded prophets in the wilderness. Instead, as many of the entries in the Levinson
volume show, ever more radical solutions are finding favor again.
The stunning rapidity with which “Calexit” sanitized secession—largely spoken of
and dismissed on prudential grounds (Is it worth it? Would it work?) rather than horrified
normative ones (Is it illegal? Is this is going to restart the Civil War? Is this something
only antebellum racists would do?)—suggests that long discarded constitutional reasoning
has been put back on the table.
As Mark Killenbeck ominously noted, the U.S. Constitution, unlike the Articles of
Confederation and Confederate Constitution, does not declare its own perpetuity. 82 That
the Constitution endures but those supposedly immortal documents are now but historical
relics is an amusing irony, but these books teach us that in light of the fractures arising in
modern constitutional thought and practice we should perhaps not be so confident in that
irony.

81. ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE SURPRISING POLITICAL CAREER
OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT 48 (2007).
82. Killenbeck, supra note 62, at 247.
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